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RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
Double Jeopardy and Prosecutorial Appeal
of Sentences: DiFrancesco, Bullington, and
the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981
The mood and temper of the public with regard to the treatment of crime
and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilization of any
country.'
Winston Churchill
I. INTRODUCTION
The fifth amendment provides that no person shall be "sub-
ject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb."' 2 The double jeopardy clause protects the criminal defen-
dant by limiting the number of proceedings in which the govern-
ment can subject him to the risk of penal sanctions. This protec-
tion, as recognized by both federal and state courts in their
application of the double jeopardy principle, takes on two distinct
forms. The first form protects the defendant against successive
prosecutions. This aspect of double jeopardy provides a procedural
restraint, requiring the government to assert all similar charges re-
lating to one offense in a single proceeding. This procedural bar
prevents judicial harassment of the accused and ensures that con-
viction results from a single judgment of the evidence, rather than
from the increased probabilities of success because of multiple
1. H. BLOCH & G. GEIS, MAN, CRIME, AND SOCIETY 557 (1962) (quoting Winston
Churchill).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The fifth amendment double jeopardy clause is applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969). In addition, all
states except Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Vermont have
constitutional double jeopardy provisions. The five states that do not have a constitutional
prohibition consider protection from double jeopardy a part of their common law. AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: DOUBLE JEOPARDY 56-59 (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1932).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:709
prosecutions.3 The second form of protection prohibits multiple
punishment, which precludes augmentation of an accused's sen-
tence by conviction and punishment for several offenses when only
one was committed. This multiple punishment bar is a substantive
prohibition since it imposes a limitation on judicial interpretation
of substantive criminal law.4 The primary concern underlying this
bar is to prevent the arbitrary judicial imposition of multiple pen-
alties when the legislature intended that such an act constitute a
single offense.5
The proposed Criminal Code Reform Act of 19816 would thor-
oughly revamp the federal sentencing system and provide for in-
creases in sentences through government-initiated appellate re-
view. This proposal raises the question whether sentence appeal by
the government violates the double jeopardy clause's prohibition of
multiple punishment.7 The Supreme Court recently addressed this
issues  and held that the fifth amendment does not bar
3. In conjunction with the policy of avoiding harassment and the consequential stigma
it imposes on an accused, the procedural bar seeks also to achieve economy of time and
money and to further the psychological security of the individual who has once been prose-
cuted. See Sigler, Federal Double Jeopardy Policy, 19 VAND. L. REV. 375, 376 (1966); Note,
Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 266-67 (1965); 32 VAND. L. REV. 609, 613 (1979); 65
YALE L.J. 339, 340-41 (1956). See generally J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY (1969).
4. See M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 198 (1969); Westen & Drubel, Toward a Gen-
eral Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 81, 111-13.
5. J. SIGLER, supra note 3, at 63-69; Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense and Double
Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513, 516 (1949).
6. S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S9769-76 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1981)
[hereinafter cited as S. 1630].
7. Until recently, no state authorized the government to seek an increase in a valid
original sentence. See Note, Double Jeopardy Limits on Prosecutorial Appeal of Sentence,
1980 DUKE L.J. 847, 847 n.5 [hereinafter cited as Note, Double Jeopardy Limits]; Note,
Twice in Jeopardy: Prosecutorial Appeals of Sentences, 63 VA. L. REv. 325, 325-26 n.4
(1977). Maryland has recently enacted a statute that permits the government to appeal a
legally imposed sentence. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-302(c) (1980).
8. The question whether the government may appeal sentences has not arisen with
any frequency until now. The government has no right to appeal in the absence of express
statutory authority. United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 318 (1892). Since 1970, statutes
have authorized the federal government to initiate an appeal of sentence, but only with
respect to the prosecution of dangerous special offenders. See 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976). Re-
cently, Congress authorized the government to take expanded appeals of any kind in crimi-
nal cases. See Note, Double Jeopardy Limits, supra note 7, at 853-54. For a statutory his-
tory of the federal government's authority to take appeals in criminal cases, see United
States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336-39 (1975) (describing the history of Title III of the Om-
nibus Crime Control Act of 1970, now in effect as 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976)); United States v.
Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 307-08 (1970) (describing the history of the predecessor statutes to §
3731). As a result, the problem of government-initiated requests for increases in sentence
could not arise before 1970 except in the context of a government request to the trial court
(as opposed to the appellate court) for a reconsideration of sentence, e.g., Bozza v. United
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prosecutorial sentence appeals authorized by statute.9 The Court,
however, has subsequently ruled that a term of life imprisonment
for murder imposed in the sentencing stage of a bifurcated pro-
ceeding is final, and that a court may not increase the sentence to
death upon retrial.10
This Recent Development first traces the evolution of the
double jeopardy doctrine. The Recent Development then focuses
on the recent sentence modification cases as well as the proposed
revisions to the Federal Criminal Code. Finally, this Recent Devel-
opment attempts to develop a coherent double jeopardy rationale
and concludes that, under this proposed rationale, unilateral gov-
ernment appeal of sentences is unconstitutional.
II. TWICE IN JEOPARDY: LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Historical Background of Double Jeopardy
The early history of double jeopardy provides little assistance
in determining when the government should be allowed to appeal
in a criminal case."' American colonies as early as 1641 began legis-
lating some type of double jeopardy protection. 2 James Madison,
States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947), or a government petition to an appellate court for writ of man-
damus (as opposed to an appeal) for the correction of an illegal sentence, e.g., United States
v. Denson, 603 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1979).
9. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
10. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
11. The roots of double jeopardy can be traced to ancient Greece and Rome in the
writings of Demosthenes, DEMOSTHENES 589 (J. Vince trans. 1930) (Speech Against Lep-
tines), and in the Digest or Pandects of Justinian, in 11 S. ScoTT, THE. CIVIL LAW 17 (1932).
Double jeopardy appeared in Spanish law by 1255. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S.
100, 120-21 (1904). Early canonical law held that "God judges not twice for the offence." See
M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 4, at 5. The doctrine was firmly a part of the civil law by the time
of the Napoleonic Code. See Wilfley, Trial by Jury and "Double Jeopardy" in the Philip-
pines, 13 YALE L.J. 421, 423-24 (1904).
Development of the double jeopardy concept in England was a slow process. The
Magna Carta does not mention double jeopardy; whatever protection against repeated pros-
ecution might have been available before the fifteenth century was probably more to guard
against repeated private prosecutions than to protect against the power of the state. See J.
SIGLER, supra note 3, at 3, 14-15. Only as prosecutions for criminal violations became a
function of the state could the modern concept of double jeopardy develop. By the time of
Coke, the concept of double jeopardy had matured into protection against the state through
the common-law pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, which became available
even for relatively minor crimes. See id. at 19. Autrefois acquit allowed the defendant to
block a second trial by proving that he had previously been acquitted of the same offense,
and autrefois convict allowed a plea of former conviction to bar a second indictment for the
same crime. See United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868,.871 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S.
358 (1975).
12. Massachusetts' passage of a statutory double jeopardy bar in 1641 initiated a trend
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who first suggested the inclusion of a double jeopardy provision in
the Bill of Rights, originally proposed to the House of Representa-
tives a version that read, "No person shall be subject. . . to more
than one punishment or one trial for the same offence.... "13 Op-
ponents in the House argued unsuccessfully that Madison's propo-
sal, as worded, actually might restrict a criminal defendant's right
to a retrial after vacation of an erroneous conviction.1 4 Agreeing
with Madison's opposition, the Senate elected to prohibit a second
"jeopardy of life or limb" rather than a second trial for the same
offense. 15 The Senate debates, however, provide little insight into
the intended breadth of this version, which ultimately was
adopted. The legislators undoubtedly believed they were incorpo-
rating the existing common-law protection."6 But this English no-
tion of double jeopardy actually provided little guidance, since it
consisted of a generalized policy against repeated prosecutions and
punishment rather than a fundamental privilege that defined the
concept of finality in a criminal prosecution.' 7 The Framers' failure
to define the boundaries contributed to later confusion about the
permissible limits of government-initiated appellate review.
The ultimate constitutionality of prosecutorial appeal of
sentences may best be evaluated by examining the manner in
which the Supreme Court has balanced the government's interest
in the enforcement of criminal law with the individual's interest to
be free from multiple prosecutions in a variety of double jeopardy
contexts-reprosecution after acquittal, reprosecution after convic-
tion, reprosecution after mistrial, reprosecution after conviction
has been set aside, and cases concerning multiple punishment.
B. Reprosecution After Acquittal
In the United States the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy has developed into a doctrine broader than its
common-law predecessor.' Even in its narrowest sense, however,
the prohibition against being placed "twice in jeopardy" for the
toward adoption of a similar protection by other colonies, first by statute and eventually by
inclusion in colonial constitutions. See J. SIGLER, supra note 3, at 21-27.
13. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451-52 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
14. Id. at 753-54. See J. SIGLER, supra note 3, at 30.
15. J. SIGLER, supra note 3, at 31-32.
16. See Note, Double Jeopardy: A Problem Under Dual Sovereignty, 53 Nw. U.L.
REv. 521, 526-27 (1958).
17. For a discussion of the development of the English theory of double jeopardy, see
supra note 11.
18. Id.
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same offense shields the accused from government-initiated pro-
ceedings based upon the same offense following a final acquittal.1 9
In Kepner v. United States"° the Supreme Court acknowledged
and reaffirmed this fundamental tenet of double jeopardy jurispru-
dence. Defendant was tried and acquitted of embezzlement, but
the Government appealed and obtained a conviction in the Su-
preme Court of the Philippine Islands.2 1 Because the Govern-
ment's appeal would put defendant twice in jeopardy, the United
States Supreme Court reversed, notwithstanding Justice Holmes'
vigorous dissent. 3 Finding that "[i]t is ... the settled law of this
court that former jeopardy includes one who has been acquitted by
a verdict duly rendered, 2 4 the Court concluded that "'the defen-
dant (or his representative) is the only party who can have either a
new trial or a writ of error in a criminal case; and that a judgment
in his favor is final and conclusive.' ",25
The Kepner decision recognized the basic protections afforded
by the double jeopardy clause and the policy that finality must at-
tach to guard against multiple proceedings and their concomitant
hazards. In Arizona v. Washington"6 the Court articulated the ra-
tionale against reprosecution after acquittal:
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy unequivocally prohib-
its a second trial following an acquittal. The public interest in the finality of
criminal judgments is so strong that an acquitted defendant may not be re-
tried even though "the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous
foundation. .. ." If the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a
final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial
would be unfair.27
This apparently unequivocal rule against retrial after acquittal
has several qualifications. First, the court acquitting the defendant
19. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). See infra notes 61-64 and accompany-
ing text.
20. 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
21. Id. at 110-11. The military orders governing the administration of justice in the
Philippine Islands at that time provided for appeal of a trial court's determination. See id.
at 111-16.
22. Id. at 133-34. Congress had expressly extended the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy to the Philippine Islands. See infra note 67.
23. Justice Holmes suggested the concept of "continuing jeopardy," arguing that the
initial jeopardy started with indictment and continued through appeal and retrial. 195 U.S.
at 134-37 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see infra text accompanying notes 72-73.
24. 195 U.S. at 130.
25. Id. at 128 (quoting United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312 (1892)).
26. 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
27. Id. at 503 (quoting Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962)) (citation
omitted).
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must have had jurisdiction over the case, 2 because a judgment of
acquittal entered by a court without jurisdiction is void and, there-
fore, does not stand as a bar to the subsequent prosecution. 9 Ar-
guably, the interest of the defendant in freedom from the anxiety
and stress of repeated criminal proceedings would militate against
this rule. The jurisdiction rule, however, is well settled on the
grounds that the accused was not subject to the risk of conviction
and punishment in the absence of proper jurisdiction, and that the
interests of the government would be ignored if the void proceed-
ing resulted in immunity for the accused 30
Second, double jeopardy does not forbid reinstatement of a
guilty verdict when a jury found the defendant guilty, but the
judge granted the defendant's postverdict dismissal motion. In
United States v. Wilson31 the Court emphasized that the protec-
tion against governmental appeal did not attach because the threat
of a second trial was not present. The Court concluded,
Although review of any ruling of law discharging a defendant obviously en-
hances the likelihood of conviction and subjects him to continuing expense
and anxiety, a defendant has no legitimate claim to benefit from an error of
law when that error could be corrected without subjecting him to a second
trial before a second trier of fact.32
Because reversal of the trial judge's postverdict action would
merely reinstate the jury verdict and would not grant the prosecu-
tion a new trial or subject defendant to multiple prosecution, the
government's appeal did not offend the purpose of the double jeop-
ardy clause.3
Last, in some cases the judgment may be characterized as
something other than a formal acquittal. In United States v. Mar-
28. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 126-28 (1904).
29. Id. at 129-30.
30. See M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 4, at 77-86.
31. 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
32. Id. at 345. Wilson concerns retrial after dismissal rather than retrial after acquit-
tal. The definition of "acquittal" for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis remains nebu-
lous. See United States v. Southern Ry., 485 F.2d 309, 312 (4th Cir. 1973) (termination of
proceedings after full hearing on motion to dismiss is an acquittal); United States v. Brown,
481 F.2d 1035, 1042 (8th Cir. 1973) (dismissal upon Government's failure to provide trial
court with information needed to determine whether guilty plea should be accepted is not
an acquittal); United States v. Ponto, 454 F.2d 657, 663 (7th Cir. 1971) (dismissal of indict-
ment based upon questions raised by defense at pretrial hearing is an acquittal).
33. The Court stated, "[W]here there is no threat of either multiple punishment or
successive prosecutions the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended .... Since reversal on
appeal would merely reinstate the jury's verdict, review of such an order does not offend the
policy against multiple prosecution." 420 U.S. at 344-45.
[Vol. 35:709
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tin Linen Supply Co.3 4 the trial court granted defendant's motion
for acquittal after it had discharged a deadlocked jury. Although
the judge rather than the jury had acquitted defendant, the Su-
preme Court found that the acquittal was one in "substance as
well as form, '35 and held that an appeal by the Government was
impermissible. The Court rejected the Government's effort to dis-
tinguish the case from Kepner strictly in terms of timing of the
mistrial and acquittal decisions." The Government's argument in
Martin Linen, although unsuccessful, raises the question of the ap-
plicability of the Kepner principle when the judgment may be
characterized as something other than a formal acquittal.3
C. Reprosecution After Conviction
The principle that double jeopardy prohibits reprosecution of
the same offense after conviction is also well settled.3 8 The Su-
preme Court in United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. 9 ob-
served that "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause also accords nonappeal-
able finality to a verdict of guilty entered by judge or jury,
disabling the Government from seeking to punish a defendant
more than once for the same offense."'40 In United States v. Wil-
son 41 the Court reiterated this basic tenet: "When a defendant has
been once convicted and punished for a particular crime, principles
of fairness and finality require that he not be subjected to the pos-
sibility of further punishment by being again tried or sentenced for
the same offense.'" These statements indicate the Court's concern
about multiple punishment as well as multiple prosecutions. In-
deed, these two considerations overlap to a great extent 3 because
the government's underlying motivation for reprosecution after
conviction is the desire to secure a more severe punishment than
that originally imposed."
34. 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
35. Id. at 572.
36. Id.
37. See supra note 32. See also Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflec-
tions on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1001, 1040.41 n.146
(1980); Westen & Drubel, supra note 4, at 151-54.
38. See M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 4, at 195-217.
39. 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
40. Id. at 569 n.6 (dictum).
41. 420 U.S. 332 (.1975).
42. Id. at 343.
43. See infra notes 94-112 and accompanying text.
44. See Stern, Government Appeals of Sentences: A Constitutional Response to Arbi-
trary and Unreasonable Sentences, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 51, 86-89 (1980); Weigel, Appel-
7151982]
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D. Reprosecution After Mistrial
The resolution of fifth amendment double jeopardy issues ulti-
mately depends upon balancing the accused's interest in freedom
from multiple prosecution or punishment against the government's
interest in maintaining and enforcing the criminal law. When a de-
fendant has received a final verdict of acquittal or conviction, this
balancing process invariably favors the accused, hence the near ab-
solute bar against subsequent proceedings initiated by the govern-
ment following final judgment.45 When the first trial terminates
prematurely, however, the defendant's interest in limiting the gov-
ernment to a single proceeding may be subordinated to the legiti-
mate ends of criminal justice. The double jeopardy protection bars
reprosecution after the court declares a mistrial unless the trial
was ended because of "manifest necessity."'4" The circumstances
must be compelling and beyond the control of the court and the
prosecution to remove any possibility of prosecutorial miscon-
duct. 7 The inquiry is not prosecutorial carelessness; rather, courts
focus on whether through misconduct the government actually
might be seeking a different jury or judge. If courts were to grant a
new trial each time the prosecutor's conduct compelled a mistrial,
then prosecutors would be motivated to engage in misconduct
whenever they perceived that the judge or jury was reacting unfa-
vorably to the case. Such liberal allowance of reprosecution, of
course, would increase the probability of the defendant's
conviction.
In Illinois v. Somerville4 8 the prosecutor discovered that de-
fendant's indictment was fatally defective immediately after the
selection of the jury. The trial court granted a mistrial, since this
was the only means to cure a defective indictment under Illinois
law.4 9 Notwithstanding that the defect was due to careless error,
the Supreme Court held that a second prosecution would serve the
"ends of public justice."50 Somerville represents a conclusion that
the government's interest in convicting the guilty outweighs the
late Revision of Sentences: To Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, 20 STAN. L. REv. 405,
405-10 (1968).
45. See supra notes 19-27 & 38-44 and accompanying text.
46. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
47. See, e.g., Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) (military necessity required reloca-
tion of trial); Freeman v. United States, 237 F. 815 (2d Cir. 1916) (illness of judge).
48. 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
49. Id. at 460.
50. Id. at 459.
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need to deter prosecutorial carelessness. In Downum v. United
States51 the possibility that prosecutorial abuse had occurred was
greater. After the jury was sworn, the prosecutor discovered the
absence of a key witness, and the judge discharged the jury over
defendant's objection.2 The Supreme Court held that former jeop-
ardy prevented a new trial.5 3
Retrial of defendants after declaration of a mistrial at the ac-
cused's request requires a different analysis. In United States v.
Dinitz54 improper opening arguments by a defense counsel resulted
in his exclusion, and the trial court granted the remaining defense
counsel's motion for mistrial. Acknowledging that the "manifest
necessity" doctrine was inapposite because defendant had re-
quested the mistrial, the Supreme Court emphasized that
"[d]ifferent considerations obtain. . . when the mistrial has been
declared at the defendant's request."55 The Court observed that "a
defendant's mistrial request has objectives not unlike the interests
served by the Double Jeopardy Clause-the avoidance of the anxi-
ety, expense, and delay occasioned by multiple prosecu-
tions"e5'-and concluded that retrial was permissible. A later case
summarized Dinitz as follows:
Where the defendant, by requesting a mistrial, exercised his choice in
favor of terminating the trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause generally would
not stand in the way of reprosecution. Only if the underlying error was "moti-
vated by bad faith or undertaken to harass or prejudice,".., would there be
any barrier to retrial . . .
51. 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
52. Id. at 741 (Clark, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 734-38.
Conceivably, a prosecutor could deliberately make an error at trial if he became con-
vinced that the judge or jury was not receptive to his case, and he thought that a mistrial
would not bar reprosecution. On the other hand, a prosecutor would probably not deliber-
ately bring a defective indictment, as in Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973), to have
his case dismissed as a matter of law. See Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Prob-
lem, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1272, 1275 (1964).
54. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
55. Id. at 607; cf. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961). In Gori the trial judge
declared a mistrial sua sponte, purporting to protect defendant against possible prejudice
and noting that this action was taken for the sole benefit of accused. The Supreme Court
held that retrial was not barred. Ten years later the Court seriously questioned the Gori
ruling in United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (plurality opinion). Jorn, therefore,
casts doubt on the relevance of such a motivation for declaring a mistrial. See id. at 483.
Nevertheless, Gori demonstrates that the Court will apply the double jeopardy clause less
rigorously when it perceives the problem of reprosecution as arising from action taken by, or
in the interest of, the accused.
56. 424 U.S. at 608.
57. Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 32-33 (1977) (quoting United States v. Dinitz,
717
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These decisions reflect the Supreme Court's efforts at balanc-
ing the government's interest in furthering the administration of
justice and the accused's interest in freedom from double jeopardy.
These opinions demonstrate the significant impact that the rea-
soned choice of the defendant and the absence of governmental in-
itiative have upon the Court's balancing analysis.5 8 The defen-
dant's interest in exercising a choice in the course to be followed at
trial may outweigh the rationale for limiting the government to a
single proceeding. According to Dinitz, the defendant's right to
seek an immediate new trial via a motion for mistrial is not incon-
sistent with the policies of the double jeopardy clause. 59 This Re-
cent Development next addresses the question whether this princi-
ple of according great weight to the defendant's freedom to
determine the course of the proceedings is applicable to other
double jeopardy contexts.
E. Reprosecution After Conviction Has Been Set Aside
The double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial of a de-
fendant whose conviction has been set aside because of error in the
proceedings.60 The leading case of United States v. Ball61 simulta-
neously presented two aspects of the double jeopardy problem:
reprosecution after acquittal62 and retrial after appellate reversal
of a conviction. In Ball three defendants were charged with murder
under a defective indictment, and .two of them were convicted.
Upon writ of error, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions.
Subsequently, all three defendants were reindicted and convicted.
On a second appeal the Court, discussing the case of the defendant
who had been acquitted initially, declared that "a general verdict
of acquittal upon the issue of not guilty to an indictment under-
424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976)); accord Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 152 (1977).
58. When subsequent proceedings are the result of the defendant's efforts, the policy
objectives of the double jeopardy clause may be inapplicable. In United States v. Scott, 437
U.S. 82 (1978), the district court granted the defendant's motion for dismissal on the
grounds of preindictment delay. The Supreme Court, drawing on the Dinitz rationale, con-
cluded that "the Double Jeopardy Clause, which guards against Government oppression,
does not relieve a defendant from the consequences of his voluntary choice." Id. at 99. The
Court held that when a defendant deliberately chooses to seek termination of the proceed-
ings against him on a basis unrelated to the factual guilt or innocence of the offense of
which he is accused, he suffers no injury cognizable under the double jeopardy clause if he is
later tried for that offense. Id. at 100-01.
59. See supra text accompanying note 57.
60. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964).
61. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
62. See supra notes 18-37 and accompanying text.
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taking to charge murder, and not objected to before the verdict as
insufficient in that respect, is a bar to a second indictment for the
same killing."' Without revealing its underlying rationale, the
Court summarily dispensed with the issue raised by the two re-
maining appellants, holding that a defendant who was wrongfully
convicted at his original trial because of prejudicial error on the
part of the state may nonetheless be retried following the setting
aside of his conviction on appeal.6'
Two different theories may explain the constitutional basis for
the second holding in Ball. Nine years after Ball, in Trono v.
United States, s the Court first introduced the "waiver" theory as
a justification for allowing exceptions to the literal language of the
fifth amendment. Defendants in Trono had been tried for murder,
but were acquitted of that charge and convicted only of assault.6
Defendants appealed the assault conviction to the Philippine Su-
preme Court, which had the statutory power to make a de novo
determination of the facts and to impose a new sentence on ap-
peal.6 7 The court reversed the assault conviction but convicted de-
fendants of homicide.6 ' The United States Supreme Court held
that when a defendant appeals his conviction he waives the right
to invoke the plea of former jeopardy upon retrial.6 9 Stressing the
important distinction between appeals by the defendant and those
initiated by the government, the Court stated,
As the judgment stands before he appeals, it is a complete bar to any further
prosecution for the offense set forth in the indictment, or of any lesser degree
thereof. No power can wrest from him the right to so use that judgment, but
if he chooses to appeal from it and to ask for its reversal he thereby waives, if
successful, his right to avail himself of the former acquittal of the greater
offense, contained in the judgment which he has himself procured to be
63. 163 U.S. at 669. The Court rejected the English rule that defective indictments
could not legally place a defendant in jeopardy. See Vaux's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 992 (K.B.
1591). Justice Gray, writing for the Court, discarded the rule as unjust because it would
expose criminal defendants to a second prosecution and give a prosecutor dissatisfied with
the verdict or sentence a second opportunity to convict whenever he could discover a defect
in the original indictment. 163 U.S. at 669.
64. 163 U.S. at 672.
65. 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
66. Id. at 522.
67. Id. at 526. Congress, however, had expressly made the principles of the double
jeopardy clause applicable to criminal prosecutions in the Philippine Islands, a territory of
the United States. See Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1369, § 5, 32 Stat. 691, 692.
68. United States v. Trono, 3 Phil. 213 (1904). Under Philippine law, homicide, in
effect second degree murder, was a lesser included offense of the original murder charge, but
a higher degree offense than the assault of which defendants were convicted. 199 U.S. at
522.
69. 199 U.S. at 531-32.
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reversed.7 0
Subsequent Courts applied the waiver doctrine to affirm a number
of cases in which sentences were increased following retrials con-
ducted at the accused's behest.7 1
The other possible basis for the Ball holding is the "continu-
ing jeopardy" theory. The adoption of the waiver theory in Trono,
however, followed by one year the Court's rejection of Justice
Holmes' rationale of continuing jeopardy enunciated in his dissent
in Kepner v. United States.7 2 Holmes had argued that jeopardy
started with indictment and continued through appeal and a re-
trial subsequent to a successful appeal.7" This broad characteriza-
tion of double jeopardy has never been adopted by a majority of
the Court.7 4
The waiver doctrine survived for fifty years; the Court for-
mally abandoned the theory in Green v. United States.75 In Green
a jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder after being
instructed that it could find him guilty of either first or second
degree murder.78 The appellate court reversed the conviction and
remanded for a new trial.77 At the new trial defendant was once
again tried for first degree murder despite his plea of former jeop-
ardy.78 Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, and, on
appeal, the Supreme Court confronted again the problem of ration-
alizing the principle that allows a second trial after the defendant
has successfully appealed a conviction. The Court concluded that
70. Id. at 533.
71. E.g., Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919); Ocampo v. United States, 234
U.S. 91 (1914); Flemister v. United States, 207 U.S. 372 (1907). In Stroud the defendant,
popularly known as the "Birdman of Alcatraz," appealed and had his original conviction
and death sentence reversed. He was retried and convicted, but the sentence precluded capi-
tal punishment. Stroud was again successful on appeal and was tried for a third time. This
last conviction resulted in the reimposition of the death sentence. Relying on Trono, the
Court upheld the verdict and the sentence, observing, "thus the plaintiff in error himself
invoked the action of the court which resulted in a further trial. In such cases he is not
placed in second jeopardy within the meaning of the Constitution." 251 U.S. at 18.
72. 195 U.S. 100, 134-37 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 136.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90 n.6 (1978); United States v. Jen-
kins, 420 U.S. 358, 369 (1975); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 196 (1957). But see
Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978) (state may provide a system of bench trials before a
trial magistrate who lacks authority to acquit against the evidence or to make final rulings
of law or fact until affirmed on appeal by a higher tribunal).
75. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
76. Id. at 185-86.
77. Green v. United States, 218 F.2d 856, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1955), rev'd, 355 U.S. 184
(1957).
78. 355 U.S. at 186.
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an appeal from a conviction for a lesser included offense does not
waive protection from reprosecution for a greater offense of which
the defendant was implicitly acquitted.7 Rejecting the Trono
waiver doctrine, the Court said,
Reduced to plain terms, the Government contends that in order to secure
the reversal of an erroneous conviction of one offense, a defendant must sur-
render his valid defense of former jeopardy not only on that offense but also
on a different offense for which he was not convicted and which was not in-
volved in his appeal. Or stated in the terms of this case, he must be willing to
barter his constitutional protection against a second prosecution for an of-
fense punishable by death as the price of a successful appeal from an errone-
ous conviction of another offense for which he has been sentenced to five to
twenty years' imprisonment. As the Court of Appeals said in its first opinion
in this case, a defendant faced with such a "choice" takes a "desperate
chance" in securing the reversal of the erroneous conviction. The law should
not, and in our judgment does not, place the defendant in such an incredible
dilemma.60
Twenty-one years after Green, the Court again wrestled with
the problem of justifying a "second jeopardy" in a closely analo-
gous situation in United States v. Scott."' The Court held that
when a trial court grants a defendant's request to terminate a trial
before submission of the case to the judge or jury for a verdict, the
government has the right to appeal the dismissal and, if successful,
to reprosecute the case without violating the double jeopardy
clause.82 One of the key issues in Scott concerned the precise effect
of defendant's action to terminate the proceedings. Although the
Court stated that it did not intend to revive the waiver rationale
rejected in Green, the reasoning that it used seems practically in-
distinguishable. Scott at least adopts a new balance for determin-
ing when defendant's waiver will or will not be implied: "[W]e con-
clude that the Double Jeopardy Clause, which guards against
Government oppression, does not relieve a defendant from the
consequences of his voluntary choice." s8 Thus, Green's rejection of
the implied waiver theory apparently suffered the same fate in
Scott that the waiver theory of Trono suffered in Green: the Court
did not expressly overrule either theory but limited each to its par-
ticular facts. The net result appears to have been the rehabilitation
of the waiver theory, albeit in a limited form.
The Supreme Court attempted to resolve this lack of clarity in
79. Id. at 190-91.
80. Id. at 193.
81. 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
82. Id. at 98-99.
83. Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
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Burks v. United States.4 In Burks the jury rejected the defen-
dant's insanity defense and found him guilty of bank robbery, and
defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground that the evidence
was insufficient to support the verdict was denied. Holding that
the government had failed to rebut the defendant's proof of in-
sanity, the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for a de-
termination of whether the trial court should direct a verdict of
acquittal or order a new trial.86 The Supreme Court reversed, find-
ing that because the "Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second
trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insuf-
ficient, the only 'just' remedy available for that court is the direc-
tion of a judgment of acquittal." 86 The Burks Court distinguished
a reversal for trial error from a reversal for evidentiary insuffi-
ciency. Retrial to correct trial error is justified because "[iut would
be a high price indeed for society to pay were every accused
granted immunity from punishment because of any defect suffi-
cient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to
conviction. 81 7 Because a reversal for trial error does not indicate
that the government failed to prove its case, the reversal does not
imply that the defendant is innocent; rather, it simply indicates
that the defendant was convicted in a defective judicial proceed-
ing.8 The Court reasoned that retrial following trial error satisfies
two important interests: the accused's interest in obtaining a fair
adjudication of his guilt free from error and society's interest in
ensuring that the guilty are punished."9
By contrast, when a court has set aside a conviction because of
insufficient evidence, as in Burks, the prosecution has been given a
fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could muster.90 The
double jeopardy clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of
affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence
that it failed to produce in the first proceeding. Under Burks if the
84. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
85. United States v. Burks, 547 F.2d 968, 970 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
86. 437 U.S. at 18.
87. Id. at 15 (quoting United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964)); see also
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343-44 n.11 (1975) (retrials justified on basis of fair-
ness to both defendant and government); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949) ("[A]
defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some
instances be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just
judgments.").
88. 437 U.S. at 15.
89. Id.; see Note, Double Jeopardy: A New Trial After Appellate Reversal for Insuffi-
cient Evidence, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 365, 370 (1964).
90. 437 U.S. at 16.
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government's case is so lacking that the court should not have sub-
mitted it to the jury, the defendant should receive the same double
jeopardy protections that are afforded to a defendant receiving a
verdict of acquittal.9 1 Thus, a defendant's voluntary choice to seek
a new trial does not always preclude the application of double
jeopardy principles. 92 Reversal of the defendant's conviction be-
cause the evidence was insufficient operates as an acquittal that
bars a second prosecution. Only when the reversal of a conviction
is due to trial error is a defendant subject to a new trial.93
F. Multiple Punishment
The second protection of the double jeopardy clause is the bar
against multiple punishment,94 that is, "the principle that no man
shall more than once be placed in peril of legal penalties upon the
same accusation."9 5 The Supreme Court established in Ex parte
Lange9" that a court may not add a new sentence to one already
completed. In Lange the trial court had chosen to fine defendant
rather than to impose the alternative penalty of imprisonment au-
thorized by statute. The Supreme Court ruled that the double
jeopardy clause protected the defendant from subsequent imposi-
91. See id.
92. See id. at 18.
93. See United States v. Jaramillo, 510 F.2d 808, 811 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Rothfelder, 474 F.2d 606, 608 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973).
94. At the time the fifth amendment was adopted, imprisonment had emerged only
recently as an alternative to the death penalty, whippings, and confinement in public stocks.
See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45 (1978). In most instances the legislature pre-
scribed the period of incarceration with specificity. Id. Legislatures, however, soon replaced
mandatory sentences with schemes permitting the sentencing judge or jury to consider ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances and to select a sentence within a range defined by
the legislature. Id. at 45-46; see Tappan, Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code, 23 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 528, 529 (1958); Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing
for Felony, 81 HARV. L. REv. 821, 822-23 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Note, Judicial Sen-
tencing]. Although the original purposes of incarceration had been retribution and punish-
ment, rehabilitation later became an additional element making the system of punishment
more flexible. See S. RuBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 132-33 (2d ed. 1973); Note,
Judicial Sentencing, supra, at 823; see also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-48
(1949) ("prevalent modern philosophy of penology [is] that the punishment should fit the
offender and not merely the crime" and that, accordingly, sentences should be determined
with an eye toward the "[r]eformation and rehabilitation of offenders.").
Today the length of a federal prisoner's confinement is determined initially by the sen-
tencing judge, who selects a term within an often broad, congressionally prescribed range.
The United States Parole Board may, as a general rule, conditionally release a prisoner at
any time after he serves one-third of the judicially fixed term. 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1976).
95. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1874).
96. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874).
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tion of a prison sentence. 7 Lange presented a relatively narrow
factual situation-the multiple punishment was an additional sen-
tence imposed after the completion of the maximum authorized
punishment-and the Court's holding may be limited to that
situation.
The later decision of United States v. Benz provides some in-
sight into the multiple punishment question. 8 At issue in Benz
was whether the district court could shorten a defendant's sen-
tence after he had begun serving the term. The Supreme Court
permitted the modification, distinguishing between the trial court's
power to decrease and to increase a sentence:
The distinction that the court during the same term may amend a sen-
tence so as to mitigate the punishment, but not so as to increase it, is not
based upon the ground that the court has lost control of the judgment in the
latter case, but upon the ground that to increase the penalty is to subject the
defendant to double punishment for the same offense in violation of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution. .... 9
Without analyzing why increasing a sentence always would consti-
tute double punishment, the Court, in dictum, cited Lange as au-
thority for the proposition that multiple punishment violates the
double jeopardy clause. The Court, however, failed to consider that
Lange dealt with imposing a new sentence on a defendant who al-
ready had suffered fully the maximum penalty authorized by
statute.1 0o
The Supreme Court in Bozza v. United States0 1 authorized
correction of a sentence to conform to the specified statutory mini-
mum. Although the statute under which defendant was convicted
mandated a sentence of both fine and imprisonment, the judge im-
posed only imprisonment at the initial sentencing. Hours later,
97. Id. at 173.
98. 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
99. Id. at 307.
100. In Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900), the defendant was convicted
and sentenced; on appeal, the appellate court reversed the sentence on constitutional
grounds. Upon remand the lower court resentenced him to a longer term of imprisonment.
Although it rejected defendant's pleas of former jeopardy, the Supreme Court apparently
adopted Lange's multiple punishment analysis and accepted the broader position, suggested
in Lange, that increasing the sentence while the original one is being served is also
prohibited:
We repeat that this is not a case in which the court undertook to impose in in-
vitum a second or additional sentence for the same offense, or to substitute one sen-
tence for another. On the contrary, plaintiff in error availed himself of his right to have
the first sentence annulled so that another sentence might be rendered.
Id. at 160 (dictum).
101. 330 U.S. 160 (1947).
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however, defendant was returned to the court and fined. The Su-
preme Court held that this procedure did not put petitioner twice
in jeopardy for the same offense because the original sentence was
an invalid punishment; before the correction the court had not im-
posed a legal sentence."0 ' The Court rejected petitioner's argument,
based on the Benz dictum, that correcting his sentence to conform
to the statutory minimum increased the sentence and subjected
him to multiple punishment.
10 3
The Court squarely faced the resentencing issue in North Car-
olina v. Pearce.0 4 Defendant in Pearce had been convicted and
sentenced. Several years later his conviction was reversed in a
postconviction proceeding and he was retried.1 0 5 The second trial
resulted in a conviction and a sentence that, when added to the
time already served, amounted to a longer total sentence than that
imposed after the original trial. ' The Court held that the double
jeopardy clause offered no protection from a harsher sentence upon
reconviction.'0 7 The Court stated that it was merely affirming the
principle of Stroud v. United States'°" in which the Court upheld
imposition of the death penalty after retrial even though defen-
dant's first trial for the same offense had resulted in a life sen-
tence. 109 Pearce, thereafter, seemed to revive the expansive waiver
concept of Trono v. United States" ° despite its apparent rejection
102. Id. at 167; cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence
at any time and may correct, a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time pro-
vided herein for the reduction of sentence.").
103. 330 U.S. at 166. Whether the Court rejected the Benz dictum in its entirety or
whether Bozza was confined to situations in which the sentence originally imposed was inva-
lid is not clear from the Court's opinion. In a footnote, the Court distinguished Lange stat-
ing, "[T]he petitioner [in Bozza] had not suffered any lawful punishment until the court
had announced the full mandatory sentence of imprisonment and fine." Id. at 167 n.2 (em-
phasis in original).
104. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
105. Id. at 713.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 719-20. The Court emphasized the goal of individualized sentencing:
The freedom of a sentencing judge to consider the defendant's conduct subsequent to
the first conviction in imposing a new sentence is no more than consonant with the
principle . . . that a State may adopt the "prevalent modern philosophy of penology
that a punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime."
Id. at 723 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)) (citation omitted).
108. 251 U.S. 15 (1919); see supra note 71.
109. 395 U.S. at 720 n.16. The Court added, "we deal here, not with increases in ex-
isting sentences, but with the imposition of wholly new sentences after wholly new trials."
Id. at 722.
110. 199 U.S. 521 (1905); see supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
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in Green v. United States.'
Thus, according to Pearce, if the original sentence was over-
turned at the "behest of the defendant,""' a court does not violate
the double jeopardy clause when it increases the sentence after a
retrial. Pearce, however, did not answer the question whether the
courts could review a legally imposed sentence upon unilateral ap-
peal of the government.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
During the 1980 Term, the Supreme Court, in two different
double jeopardy cases, addressed the validity of the imposition of
an increased sentence at the behest of the prosecution, ' and
reached divergent results. In addition, the Senate version of the
proposed recodification of the Federal Criminal Code provides for
government appeal of sentences." 4 These inconsistent develop-
ments illustrate the current uncertainty regarding the finality of
sentences.
A. Recent Decisions
1. United States v. DiFrancesco
In 1970 Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act
(Act), which authorizes the government to request that the trial
judge make a finding that the defendant meets the statutory defi-
nition of a "dangerous special offender" and, if that finding is
made, to seek enhanced sentencing at the trial level.115 The Act
also authorizes the prosecutor to appeal sentences imposed by the
trial judge under the dangerous special offender provision., 6
In DiFrancesco defendant was convicted of federal racketeer-
ing offenses.1 7 The trial court then held a hearing at which it ruled
that defendant was a dangerous special offender within the mean-
ing of the Act." 8 The court sentenced defendant to two concurrent
111. 355 U.S. 184 (1957); see supra text accompanying notes 75-80.
112. 395 U.S. at 721.
113. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449
U.S. 117 (1980).
114. S. 1630, supra note 6, at § 3725.
115. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-3576 (1976).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976).
117. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 122 (1980). Defendant was convicted
for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976) (damaging federal property), 18 U.S.C. § 842(j)
(1976) (unlawfully storing explosives), and 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) (conspiracy). 449 U.S. at
122.
118. 449 U.S. at 122,
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ten-year terms on the racketeering counts, to be served concur-
rently with a nine-year term imposed earlier in an unrelated
trial. 119 Exercising its right of appeal for the first time, 2 ' the Gov-
ernment sought review of those sentences in the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. The Government contended that the trial
court had abused its discretion by imposing only one year of addi-
tional punishment under the dangerous special offender provi-
sion. 12' The Second Circuit dismissed the Government's appeal on
double jeopardy grounds. 22
Upon grant of certiorari, 23 the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Second Circuit. 24 Writing for the Court, Justice
Blackmun observed that the double jeopardy clause does not ban
completely government-initiated appeals in a criminal case; the
clause bars only those appeals that present a threat of reprosecu-
tion after acquittal. 125 "Appeal of a sentence. . . would seem to be
a violation of double jeopardy only if the original sentence . . . is
to be treated in the same way as an acquittal is treated, and the
appeal is to be treated in the same way as a retrial.' 26 The Court
looked to North Carolina v. Pearce27 and determined that Pearce
had rejected by implication the notion that the first sentence con-
stitutes an implied acquittal of any greater sentence and therefore
cannot be increased. 28 Justice Blackmun found the distinction be-
tween the case at bar, in which the trial court imposed the greater
sentence after a state-initiated appeal, and Pearce, in which the
119. Id. At the earlier trial defendant was convicted for violation of- 18 U.S.C. §
1962(c) and (d) (1976) (racketeering and conspiracy). 449 U.S. at 122.
120. 449 U.S. at 125 n.9.
121. United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769, 780 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S.
117 (1980).
122. Id. at 787.
123. 444 U.S. 1070 (1980).
124. 449 U.S. 117 (1980). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell, and
Rehnquist joined in Justice Blackmun's majority opinion. Justice Brennan wrote a dissent-
ing opinion in which Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens joined. Justice Stevens wrote a
separate dissenting opinion.
125. Id. at 132. The Court relied on United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430
U.S. 564 (1977), United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975), and United States v. Scott,
437 U.S. 82 (1978), to support the proposition that the double jeopardy clause does not bar
sentence appeals. 449 U.S. at 132. In all three of these cases, the Government brought its
appeals pursuant to statutes authorizing appeals by the state from judgments dismissing
indictments. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 31-37 & 58 and accompanying
text and text accompanying notes 81-83.
126. 449 U.S. at 133.
127. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
128. 449 U.S. at 135 n.14; see supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
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greater sentence followed retrial, to be "no more than a 'conceptual
nicety.'119
The Court found the analogy between appeals and retrials also
to be unpersuasive in light of the "basic design" of the double
jeopardy clause as "a bar against repeated attempts to convict,
with consequent subjection of the defendant to embarassment, ex-
pense, anxiety, and insecurity and the possibility that he may be
found guilty even though innocent." 130 Because a defendant is
charged with notice of the government's authority to appeal, an
appeal would not defeat any legitimate expectation of finality in
his sentence."1 Furthermore, the Court stated that a defendant
has no right to know, at any given time, the maximum limit of his
sentence. 3 2 "The defendant's primary concern and anxiety obvi-
ously relate to the determination of innocence or guilt . .. .11
The Court concluded, therefore, that the considerations which bar
reprosecution following acquittal do not bar sentencing appeals by
the government.
Justice Blackmun then turned to the question of whether gov-
ernment-initiated appeals offend the double jeopardy clause's pro-
hibition against multiple punishment. The Court refused to be per-
suaded by the dictum in United States v. Benz,13 4 which had
suggested that an increased single sentence is in effect a second
sentence barred by the double jeopardy clause, and held that lan-
guage not susceptible to general application. 35 Analogizing the in-
stant decision to its prior holdings on the constitutionality of two-
stage criminal trials, 38 the Court reasoned that Congress could
have avoided the issue by providing a mandatory sentence for a
dangerous special offender and allowing the trial judge to recom-
mend a lesser sentence to the court of appeals. "No double jeop-
ardy policy is advanced by approving one of these procedures and
declaring the other unconstitutional.'13 7
Justice Brennan, in dissent, argued that the Benz language
129. 449 U.S. at 136 (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 722 (1969)).
130. 449 U.S. at 136.
131. Id. at 137.
132. Id. The Court cited a.line of probation and parole revocation cases to buttress
this proposition. Id.
133. Id. at 136.
134. 282 U.S. 304 (1931); see supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
135. 449 U.S. at 138-39.
136. Id. at 140-41. The Court referred to the two-tiered juvenile trial system approved
in Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978). See supra note 74.
137. 449 U.S. at 142.
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articulated a consistent assumption of the Court.1 8 The dissent
opined that an "analytic similarity" exists between sentences and
acquittals to the extent that the imposition of a sentence consti-
tutes a finding that the facts do not warrant a greater sentence.1 39
Justice Brennan submitted that the majority's argument that the
embarrassment and anxiety were behind a defendant once his guilt
was determined was "startling." The dissent further maintained
that the amount of time to be served concerned defendants more
than whether their record showed a conviction.140 The dissent criti-
cized the majority's reliance on Pearce because Pearce stood only
for the proposition that a court may increase a sentence upon re-
trial.14  Finally, the dissent argued that the instant case was not
analogous to a two-stage criminal trial because the trial judge, un-
like the special master at the first tier of a two-tier proceeding, had
the authority to impose a final sentence. 142
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, distinguished Pearce on
other grounds. The Pearce Court had explained its decision as a
corollary of the premise that "'the original conviction has, at the
defendant's behest, been wholly nullified.' ",148 Thus, Justice Ste-
vens concluded that Pearce did not apply because the prosecution
in the case at bar sought a more severe sentence for a valid
conviction.
2. Bullington v. Missouri
Missouri statutes provide that an accused found guilty of capi-
tal murder may be sentenced to death only if, at a separate post-
conviction hearing, the jury unanimously finds beyond a reasona-
138. Id. at 144-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 146. The dissent argued that the probation and parole cases used as sup-
port for sentence appeals by the majority were inapposite because in those cases the defen-
dant knew from the outset the maximum time he could be forced to serve. Id. at 148.
140. Id. at 149-50. The dissent also criticized as "circular" the Court's reliance upon
the expectations of the defendant since "the very statute which increases and prolongs the
defendant's anxiety alleviates it by conditioning his expectations." Id. at 150. Justice Bren-
nan reasoned that the same argument would validate a statute authorizing government ap-
peals from verdicts of acquittal. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 18-27.
141. 449 U.S. at 151. The dissent suggested that Pearce rested on the notion that a
trial court cannot be denied the power to sentence a defendant. Id.; see supra note 107.
142. 449 U.S. at 151-52. In response to the argument that Congress, by altering the
proceedings, could have created a system that would have had the same effect without rais-
ing the double jeopardy issue, the dissent stated that courts should review statutes in the
form in which they are written. Id. at 148.
143. Id. at 153 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 721 (1969)).
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ble doubt that the accused committed the crime under at least one
of ten specific aggravating circumstances. 144 In Bullington the jury
sentenced defendant to life imprisonment.1 45 The court then
granted defendant's motion for a new trial because of constitu-
tional defects in Missouri's jury selection process.1" The State
again indicated its intention to seek the death penalty, and defen-
dant moved to strike.1 47 The trial court announced that it would
grant defendant's motion, and, in response, the prosecution ob-
tained a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of
Missouri.1 48
Upon grant of certiorari, 49 the United States Supreme Court
reversed the Supreme Court of Missouri.1 50 Justice Blackmun,
again writing for the Court, qualified the broad language in
DiFrancesco concerning the finality of sentences. He stated, "The
imposition of a particular sentence usually is not regarded as an
'acquittal' of any more severe sentence that could have been im-
posed. ' 151 In this situation, however, since defendant's life sen-
tence was imposed after a postconviction hearing that had the pro-
cedural "hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence," the Court
reasoned that the jury had acquitted defendant of the death pen-
alty. 1 52 Justice Blackmun opined that normally, the sentencer's
discretion is "essentially unfettered. 15 3 He noted, however, that
the Bullington situation did not follow the norm, since the Mis-
souri statute limited the jury's discretion to impose the death pen-
alty to cases in which the jury could find specific aggravating cir-
cumstances. The Court, relying on Burks v. United States,1"
found that the imposition of the life imprisonment sentence repre-
sented a finding that the evidence was insufficient to justify capital
144. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 565.006, .008.1, .012 (1978).
145. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 435-36 (1981).
146. Id. at 436. While defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal and, in the alter-
native, for a new trial were pending, the Supreme Court struck down Missouri constitutional
and statutory provisions allowing women automatic exemption from jury service. Duren v.
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
147. 451 U.S. at 436.
148. State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908 (Mo. 1980) (en banc).
149. 449 U.S. 819 (1980).
150. 451 U.S. 430 (1981). Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Stevens joined in
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion. Justice Powell wrote a dissenting opinion in which
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist joined.
151. Id. at 438.
152. Id. at 439.
153. Id.
154. 437 U.S. 1 (1978); see supra text accompanying notes 84-93.
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punishment.1 55 Since Burks held that a defendant may not be re-
tried if he obtains a reversal of the conviction for evidentiary in-
sufficiency, the Court concluded that, similarly, this defendant's
punishment could not be increased upon reconviction since the ev-
idence had already been deemed insufficient to justify the harsher
penalty. 156
Justice Powell, in dissent, contended that DiFrancesco and
Pearce had recognized an "unqualified" and "fundamental differ-
ence" between acquittals and sentences. 157 The dissent charged the
majority with failing to consider the reasons why retrials are
barred in the sentencing context.158 Because a sentence cannot "be
deemed correct or erroneous if it is duly made within the authority
conferred by the legislature,"1 59 the dissent concluded that no basis
exists for barring the prosecution from attempting to impose the
death penalty upon retrial.160
B. Proposed Revisions to the Federal Criminal Code
The Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981161 is an ambitious at-
tempt by the Senate to recodify and revise the Federal Criminal
Code. This recodification would be the first in the history of the
United States.162 In addition to addressing issues such as federal
jurisdiction, 163 substantive law,"" and criminal behavior,1 "5 the
proposal contains sweeping reforms of the sentencing process. The
Senate bill prescribes the use of sentencing guidelines to be
155. 451 U.S. at 441-46. The Court noted that DiFrancesco also involved a bifurcated
proceeding at which the government was required to prove additional facts, including that
the accused was a dangerous special offender. Justice Blackmun contrasted the "preponder-
ance of the evidence" standard in DiFrancesco to the requirement in the instant case of
"beyond a reasonable doubt" and concluded that the Missouri standard, unlike that in
DiFrancesco, was "'designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous
judgment."' Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)).
156. Id. at 444-45.
157. Id. at 448-49.
158. Id. at 450-51.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. S. 1630, supra note 6; see also H.R. 4711, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CoNG. Ruc.
H7195 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1981) (referred to the Committee on the Judiciary) (Criminal Code
Revision Act of 1981); H.R. 1647, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H372 (daily ed. Feb.
4, 1981) (same).
162. See Freeman & Earley, -United States v. DiFrancesco: Government Appeal of
Sentences, 18 Am. CRiM. L. REV. 91, 91 (1980).
163. S. 1630, supra note 6, § 201.
164. E.g., id. § 1853.
165. Id. § 301.
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promulgated by a new agency-the United States Sentencing
Commission."'6 The guidelines would direct the trial court's deter-
mination of what type and length of imprisonment or probation to
impose.16 7 The proposed legislation would require the court to con-
sider these guidelines, including "the sentencing range established
for the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable
category of defendant."1 8 The proposal also would require the
judge to state in open court the reasons for imposing a particular
sentence. 16 9 The Sentencing Commission's guidelines would be rec-
ommendations and not requirements. The sentencing court may,
within the lawful limits set by proposed section 2301,170 deviate
from the sentencing range and impose a longer or shorter term of
imprisonment than that provided for in the Commission's guide-
lines.17 1 Two important consequences would result from the adop-
tion of these proposals. Not only must the court state the specific
reason for imposing a sentence outside the recommended range, 17 2
but, more importantly, its action is subject to appellate review.173
166. Id. § 2003(a)(4).
167. Id. § 2003(b).
168. Id. § 2003(a)(4).
169. Id. § 2003(c).
170. Id. § 2301. Section 2301 delineates authorized terms of imprisonment for specific
classes of felonies and misdemeanors. In effect, this section establishes the maximum lawful
term of imprisonment that a sentencing court may impose for a particular category of
offense.
171. Id. § 2003(b).
172. Id. § 2003(c)(2).
173. Id. § 3725. Section 3725 provides in pertinent part:
(b) APPEAL BY THE GOVERNMENT.-The government may, with the per-
sonal approval of the Attorney General or the Solicitor General, file a notice of appeal
in the district court for review of an otherwise final sentence imposed for a felony or a
Class A misdemeanor if the sentence includes a lesser fine or term of imprisonment or
term of supervised release than the minimum established in the guidelines, or includes
a less limiting condition of probation or supervised release under section 2103(b)(6) or
(b)(11) than the minimum established in the guidelines, that are issued by the Sen-
tencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(1), and that are found by the sen-
tencing court to be applicable to the case, unless-
(1) the sentence is equal to or greater than the sentence recommended or not
opposed by the attorney for the government pursuant to a plea agreement under Rule
11(e)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; or
(2) the sentence is that provided in an accepted plea agreement pursuant to Rule
11(e)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(c) REVIEW.-If a notice of appeal is filed in the district court pursuant to sub-
section (a) or (b), the clerk shall certify to the court of appeals-
(1) that portion of the record in the case that is designated as pertinent by either
of the parties;
(2) the presentence report; and
(3) the information submitted during the sentencing proceeding.
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Proposed section 3725 provides for limited appellate review of
sentences. 17 4 The provision deals only with sentences imposed for
felonies and excludes those based upon plea bargaining as well as
sentences within the applicable range recommended by the Sen-
tencing Commission. The defendant may seek this appellate review
if the final sentence imposed is higher that the maximum estab-
(d) CONSIDERATION.-Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall
determine whether the sentence imposed is unreasonable, having regard for-
(1) the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, as set forth in part III of
this title; and
(2) the reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence, as stated by the
district court pursuant to the provisions of section 2003(c).
(e) DECISION AND DISPOSITION.-If the court of appeals determines that the
sentence is-
(1) unreasonable, it shall state specific reasons for its conclusions and-
(A) if it determines that the sentence is too high and the appeal has been
filed under subsection (a), shall set aside the sentence and-
(i) remand the case for imposition of a lesser sentence;
(ii) remand the case for further sentencing proceedings; or
(iii) impose a lesser sentence;
(B) if it determines that the sentence is too low and the appeal has been
filed under subsection (b), shall set aside the sentence and-
(i) remand the case for imposition of a greater sentence;
(ii) remand the case for further sentencing proceedings; or
(iii) impose a greater sentence; or
(2) not unreasonable, it shall affirm the sentence.
174. The Senate has included this provision in prior criminal code reform proposals.
See S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S12203, § 3725 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1979); S.
1437, 95th Cong., 1st Seas., 123 CONG. Rc. 37655, § 3725 (1977); S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
121 CONG. REc. 211, § 3725 (1975). The House consistently has opposed such a provision.
See Drinan, Ward & Beier, The Federal Criminal Code: The Houses are Divided, 18 Am.
CRIM. L. REv. 509, 511-14, 526-27 (1981). The two versions of the Criminal Code Reform Act
presently before the House do not provide for government appeal of sentences. See H.R.
4711, 97th Cong., 1st Seas., 127 CONG. Rc. H7195 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1981); H.R. 1647, 97th
Cong., 1st Ses., 127 CONG. REc. H372 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1981). Another bill presently before
the House expressly disallows modification of a term of imprisonment after the sentence has
been imposed. See H.R. 4492, 97th Cong., 1st Seass., 127 CONG. REc. H6323, § 7703 (daily ed.
Sept. 16, 1981).
The Justice Department is in favor of government appeal of sentences. See Criminal
Code Reform: Hearings on H.R. 1647 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 28, 1981) (statement of Attorney
General William French Smith). At oral argument before the Supreme Court in
DiFrancesco, the government was less concerned with saving the dangerous special offender
statute than with "establish[ing] the right of Congress to authorize government appeals of
sentences on a broad scale." Arguments Before the Court, 49 U.S.L.W. 3261, 3261 (U.S. Oct.
14, 1980).
After some vacillation, the ABA resolved recently to oppose government appeal of
sentences. See Ad Hoc Committee on the Federal Criminal Code, ABA Section of Corpora-
tion, Banking and Business Law, Report on Governmental Appeal of Sentences, 35 Bus.
LAw. 617, 624-28 (1980). See also Freeman & Earley, supra note 162, at 91-93 (background
of ABA consideration).
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lished by the guidelines, and the government may seek review if
the sentence is lower than the minimum prescribed. If the govern-
ment decides to appeal a sentence, it initiates the review process
by filing a notice of appeal with the district court. The court then
certifies to the court of appeals designated portions of the record,
the presentence report, and the information submitted during the
sentencing proceedings. 7 5 The court of appeals, in reviewing the
record, considers both the circumstances in which the imposition
of the sentence under section 2003 is appropriate and the reasons
for the sentence stated by the trial court.176 If the appellate court
concludes that the sentence imposed was not unreasonable, it must
affirm. 177 If the appellate court finds that the sentence imposed
was unreasonable, however, section 3725 authorizes the court to
impose a greater sentence, to remand for imposition of a greater
sentence, or to remand for further sentence proceedings.17 8 In ef-
fect, section 3725 authorizes the prosecution to seek an increase of
the trial court's sentence on appeal.
IV. ANALYsis
The Supreme Court's decision in DiFrancesco is a significant
departure from precedent. The DiFrancesco Court found no differ-
ence between the government's appeal and a defendant's appeal.1 79
The Court relied on its holding in Pearce that double jeopardy
does not bar the imposition of a more severe sentence following
retrial 80 for the proposition that the government may appeal a le-
gally'imposed sentence.181 Pearce, however, does not support the
constitutionality of government appeal of sentences. That issue
simply was not before the Pearce Court.182 The first few words of
the majority opinion reveal the essence of the Pearce decision:
"When at the behest of a defendant ... ,,8 The DiFrancesco
175. S. 1630, supra note 6, § 3725(c).
176. Id. § 3725(d).
177. Id. § 3725(e)(2).
178. Id. § 3725(e)(1)(B). If the court of appeals determines that the sentence imposed
was too high, section 3725(e) authorizes the court to impose a lesser sentence, to remand for
imposition of a lesser sentence, or to remand for further sentence proceedings. Id. §
3725(e)(1)(A).
179. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980); see supra text accom-
panying note 129.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 104-12.
181. 449 U.S. at 136.
182. See supra text accompanying note 112.
183. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 713 (1969) (emphasis added).
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Court's analysis fails to consider that in Pearce and all prior cases
the Court had focused only on the propriety of additional proceed-
ings initiated by the defendant, not by the government.'"
Traditional double jeopardy analysis has recognized a funda-
mental distinction between voluntary actions by defendants that
subject them to multiple proceedings and actions by the govern-
ment that subject defendants to repeated attempts to convict and
to punish. In contrast to the stringent limitations placed on the
power of the government, "[a] very different situation is presented,
with considerations persuasive of a different legal result, when the
defendant is not content with his conviction."185 The rationale for
allowing retrials after a defendant's successful appeal of a convic-
tion, 186 a defendant's request for a mistrial,187 or a defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss188 is rooted in the history of the double jeopardy
clause.8 " Such action by the defendant creates a situation that is
outside the ambit of the fifth amendment's protection against ex-
cessive use of prosecutorial power. The distinction between appeals
taken by the defendant and appeals taken by the government has
figured prominently in the Court's opinions; it can hardly be dis-
missed as a "conceptual nicety."1910 Pearce and other decisions that
upheld the imposition of a harsher sentence on an accused retried
after proceedings initiated "at the behest of the defendant," 119 are
inapposite to the issue of prosecutorial appeal of sentences.
The divergent treatment of prosecutorial appeal of sentences
by the Supreme Court in DiFrancesco and Bullington may be at-
tributed to the Court's failure in DiFrancesco to acknowledge the
trial judge's factfinding role in sentencing. In Bullington the sen-
tencing jury's role as a factfinder was explicit; hence the Court af-
forded its sentence double jeopardy protection. In DiFrancesco,
however, the Court failed to recognize that a judge, in meting out a
sentence, makes a similar factual determination. A major implica-
tion of the Court's decision in DiFrancesco is that conviction alone
184. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978); United States v. Jenkins, 420
U.S. 358 (1975); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184 (1957); Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 380 (1919); see also supra notes 58 & 71
and text accompanying notes 79-83 & 104-12.
185. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 214 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
186. See supra notes 60-82 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
190. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980).
191. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 713 (1969).
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provides sufficient information for the determination of the so-
cially optimum sentence. This implication is contrary to the con-
cept of individualized sentencing emphasized in Pearce.192
As praiseworthy as the concept of uniform sentences may be
as an abstract matter, the notion presupposes equal punishment
for equal guilt.193 Rarely, if ever, can a court view two separate and
distinct acts by different individuals, at different times and places,
and under different circumstances, as equally guilty or morally
reprehensible, even though they both constitute the same of-
fense."" Generalization, of course, is necessary in drafting criminal
statutes, and fine distinctions must inevitably give way to rough
justice. The same kind of generalization, oversimplification, and
depersonalization, however, should not carry over to the imposition
of sentences. If the criminal justice system is to fulfill its goals of
rehabilitation, protection, and deterrence, then the sentencing
judge must attempt to individualize sentences. To this end, sen-
tencing judges engage in a factual determination similar to that
undertaken by the sentencing jury, albeit less procedurally for-
mal.195 A disappointed prosecutor or an appellate judge should not
be authorized to second-guess the trial judge who saw and heard
the evidence at the trial and the sentencing hearing. Double jeop-
ardy protection should attach to the decision of a trial judge at a
DiFrancesco type sentencing hearing as it does to the decision of a
jury in the Bullington type bifurcated proceeding. The Court
reached the contrary result in DiFrancesco by focusing on the pro-
cedural distinctions rather than the substantive similarities.
By relying on Burks v. United States' and emphasizing that
the defendant was acquitted of any harsher sentence when he was
sentenced to life imprisonment, the Court in Bullington perhaps is
192. See supra note 107; see also supra note 94.
193. See Appellate Review of Sentences: A Symposium at the Judicial Conference of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 32 F.R.D. 249, 273 (1962) (re-
marks of Judge Sobeloff) (goal of sentencing review is not uniformity of sentences but "a
uniformly fair and equitable approach" to sentencing).
194. Id.
195. A conventional sentencing hearing is not unlike the separate proceeding in Bull-
ington. The prosecutor has the opportunity to recommend a sentence and to present infor-
mation relevant to sentencing. Most prosecutors actively participate in sentencing hearings,
and their recommendations generally are persuasive to judges. See Teitelbaum, The Prose-
cutor's Role in the Sentencing Process: A National Survey, 1 AM. J. CRIM. L. 75 (1972);
Comment, The Prosecutor's Role in California Sentencing: Advocate or Informant? 20
U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1379 (1973).
196. 437 U.S. 1 (1978); see supra text accompanying notes 84-93.
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reviving the "implied acquittal" concept of Green.197 Bullington,
Burks, and Green support a broad double jeopardy rule that would
protect all sentenced convicts from the imposition of a harsher
sentence upon appeal by the government. Employing the analysis
implicit in the Court's treatment of Bullington, the argument
would be as follows: When a particular penalty is selected from a
range of penalties prescribed for a given offense, the judge or jury
is implicitly "acquitting" the defendant of a greater penalty, just
as the jury in Green impliedly acquitted the defendant of a higher
offense and just as the convicting juries in other cases have im-
pliedly acquitted the accused of a greater degree of the same of-
fense.19 s Thus, for double jeopardy purposes, the range of penalties
applicable to a given offense would be treated the same as the
range of degrees for a given offense. Failure to impose a higher
penalty, like a failure to find guilty of a higher degree because of
insufficient evidence, would amount to an acquittal of that degree
of punishment and preclude appeal.199
The Green Court emphasized the unconstitutionality of giving
the prosecutor this second opportunity in the form of a govern-
mental appeal of a sentence previously imposed by the trial judge.
The Court held that jeopardy on a charge ended when the oppor-
tunity of the government to convict a defendant expired at the
time the jury found him guilty of only a lesser offense. 00 The em-
phasis on "the full opportunity to return a verdict"20 1 reflects the
Court's concern about allowing the government more than one oc-
casion to prosecute the defendant. This rationale extends beyond
the opportunity to obtain a conviction and encompasses the oppor-
tunity to obtain the prosecutor's preferred sentence. The prosecu-
tor has had the opportunity to support his preferred sentence by
presenting his evidence and his arguments both at trial and at a
sentencing hearing. Once he has marshaled all his arguments and
presented them to the sentencing judge, the Green and Burks ra-
tionales bar further prosecutorial attempts to gain a more severe
sentence. This Recent Development submits that this analysis,
along with the recognition of a sentencing judge's fact-finding role
and the Pearce sentiment that the sentencing process is an integral
197. See supra text accompanying notes 75-80.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 84-93.
200. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957); see supra text accompanying
notes 79-80.
201. 355 U.S. at 191.
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part of the trial process, require that double jeopardy protection
attach at the imposition of a sentence and thereby preclude gov-
ernment-initiated appellate review of the sentence.
Because the proposed revisions to the Federal Criminal Code
allow the government to appeal sentences that are less severe than
the minimum sentence recommended in the guidelines,02 a natural
tendency would exist for courts to transform the lower end of those
guidelines into the equivalent of a statutory minimum sentence.20
Because prosecutors normally will oppose sentences of less than
the minimum guidelines and because judges are usually adverse to
having their decisions overturned, a statute providing the govern-
ment a right to appeal sentences that are below the guidelines
would place a form of subtle pressure on the sentencing judge. A
sentencing code that provides for sentencing guidelines and yet
permits the government to appeal sentences that are more lenient
than those recommended in the guidelines threatens the same
evils, 0 4 albeit in a milder and less direct form, as those that result
from statutory minimum sentences. 0 5
Finally, giving prosecutors a right to appeal sentences they re-
gard as too lenient would unduly enhance prosecutorial powers in
the most sensitive criminal cases-those in which the accused has
not negotiated a plea bargain. Although these "unbargained" cases
make up only five to ten percent of all criminal convictions,es
these cases will often be the cases in which defendants are most
offensive to the community, public emotions run the highest, and
the pressure for subjective or political abuse of prosecutorial power
202. See supra text accompanying notes 174-78.
203. See Labbe, Appellate Review of Sentences: Penology on the Judicial Doorstep,
68 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 122, 132 (1977).
204. These evils are generally oversimplification, undermining of rehabilitation, deter-
ring jury convictions, and long range erosion of respect for law because of perceived harsh-
ness of sentences. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, § 18-2.1(c), at 5; id. § 18-4.3(a), at 87 (2d ed.
approved Aug. 1979).
205. The Government agreed in DiFrancesco that mandatory minimum sentences are
undesirable. Brief for United States at 61, United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117
(1980). The Government, however, contended that the absence of a provision for govern-
ment appeal of sentences below the minimum set in the guidelines would force Congress to
enact statutory minimum sentences. Id. If minimum sentences are to be imposed legisla-
tively, Congress should forthrightly address this important issue rather than have the
equivalent to statutory minimum sentences enacted sub silentio through government ap-
peals of sentences.
206. See Kaplan, American Merchandising and the Guilty Plea: Replacing the Ba-
zaar with the Department Store, 5 Am. J. CrmM. L. 215, 217 (1977).
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are the greatest.207
V. CONCLUSION
Appellate review of sentencing like that endorsed in
DiFrancesco and the Criminal Code Reform Act is antagonistic to
the interests and policies identified and protected by the Supreme
Court in previous double jeopardy decisions. Admittedly,
prosecutorial appeal of sentences may further a legitimate govern-
mental interest in rationalizing sentencing decisions. Indeed every
application of the double jeopardy clause impairs the efficient
prosecution of alleged criminal offenders. The double jeopardy
clause, however, should function as a limitation on the
prosecutorial power. Once the prosecution has secured a legally en-
forceable sentence, finality should attach to that decision in favor
of the defendant. The need to ensure that the defendant does not
have to repeat his personal ordeal should limit the power of the
government to expose the defendant to the full range of criminal
punishment.
RONALD P. O'HANLEY, I
207. Political pressure often builds up in some of these celebrated or notorious
cases, cases involving homicide and rape and fraud and industrial disputes and other
similarly sensitive matters, and it would be regrettable if the ... prosecutor were sub-
ject to pressure to exercise the right to appeal. The public is frequently ill-informed
when alleging that a sentence is wrong. Politicians and others pressing for things are
not always over-endowed with wisdom or even scrupulousness. Sentencing is best left
to the independent judiciary.
Samuels, Should the Prosecutor Have the Right to Appeal?, 130 NEw L.J. 104, 105 (1980).
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